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I want to thank this Committee for inviting me to testify on the important issue that is
before it today.
I also want to congratulate and thank Chairman Peterson, Ranking Member Lucas, the
whole Committee, and the Committee staff for the Committee‟s continuing hard work,
thoughtful analysis, and leadership that it has brought to bear on the widespread concerns that the
deregulated over-the-counter derivatives market has caused the most serious financial distress in
the Nation‟s economy since the Great Depression.
Since the summer of 2008, this Committee has repeatedly taken the leadership on
regulatory issues of greatest concern to the American people. When gas prices were reaching
over $4.00 a gallon by the end of June 2008, this Committee drafted on a day‟s notice and
supervised the June 26, 2008 passage by a vote of 402 -19 emergency legislation that would have
required the CFTC to implement emergency procedures in the crude oil futures markets to bring
down the then sky rocketing price of gasoline, heating oil, and crude oil1. The Committee then
drafted and supervised the passage by a 283-133 September 18, 2008 vote of the Commodity
Markets Transparency Act of 2008, which was designed to bring transparency and accountability
to the OTC energy markets, thereby stifling excessive speculation and unnecessarily high prices
for America‟s energy needs.2 Evidence adduced since the passage of this September 2008
legislation on the House floor has made it even clearer that excessive speculation in the
unregulated energy and swaps markets has caused and continues to cause unnecessary and
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substantial volatility in the agriculture and energy markets. 3 On January 14, 2009, for example, it
was reported that, “[b]etween Christmas [2008] and a week ago oil prices soared 40 percent,
only to reverse almost as sharply in recent days.”4 "The oil markets are suffering acute
whiplash," said Daniel Yergin, an energy consultant and author of "The Prize," a history of world
oil markets. "Price volatility is adding to the sense of shock and confusion and uncertainty."5
From October through December 2008, this Committee has held a highly productive,
informative and widely publicized series of hearings on the role unregulated over-the-counter
(“OTC”) financial derivatives have played in causing the present economic meltdown. Now,
under the leadership of Chairman Peterson, a new and comprehensive Discussion Draft of the
Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009, this has been circulated for
comment and is the subject of today‟s hearings. Again, that draft legislation is designed to apply
time-tested tools of market regulation to the OTC agriculture, energy and financial derivatives
markets.
There can be little doubt that the overwhelming message of the testimony presented to
this Committee in its hearings on OTC derivatives has largely established a consensus that the
previously unregulated OTC markets have caused severe systemic economic shocks to the
economy, because of a lack of transparency to the Nation‟s financial regulators of these private
bilateral agreements, and because of inadequate capital reserves set aside by OTC derivative
counterparties to underpin the trillions of dollars of financial commitments they made (and are
now owed) through the OTC transactions in question.
In almost all the credit markets examined, the derivative transactions have increased
exponentially the risk and resulting indebtedness within the underlying markets. For example,
New York Insurance Superintendent, Eric Dinallo, who has been responsible for overseeing two
major troubled financial institutions that come within his regulatory ambit (AIG and MBIA), has
demonstrated that outstanding credit default swaps (“CDS”) “could total three times as much as
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the actual debt outstanding” in the markets for which the CDS provide guarantees.6 In other
words, because of “naked” credit default swaps that provide payouts to counterparties who have
no interest insurable risk emanating from debts within these markets (i.e., they are simply
wagering, for example, in exchange for a relatively small insurance-like premium, that subprime
mortgages will not be paid off), the actual billions of dollars of losses in these markets have been
magnified three fold by rampant and uncontrolled “betting” on these markets.7
By virtue of bailouts, guarantees, and loans (e.g., the FED exchanging Treasuries at its
discount window for banks‟ troubled subprime assets) made by the United States Treasury
and/or the Federal Reserve, the American taxpayer has been required to make good on
unfulfilled or potentially unfulfilled commitments of our largest financial institutions in the OTC
derivatives market of up to $6 trillion.8 With the advent of the stimulus legislation and President
Obama‟s soon to be announced overarching financial package, the American public‟s outlay will
doubtless soon grow by further trillions of dollars through further possible guarantees, purchases
of troubled assets (i.e. a “bad bank”), mortgage and other loans, and further capital infusions into
the financial system.
Of course, the subject of today‟s hearing does not, and cannot, address the present multitrillion dollar “hole” in our economy, which, in turn, has brought the world markets to their
knees. This hearing and the legislation to which it is addressed is forward looking. The
underlying thesis here is: if we are fortunate enough to dig ourselves out of the huge financial
mire in which we find ourselves, a regulatory structure must be put in place that will prevent the
risk creating and risk bearing folly that led to the present fiasco.
I have appended hereto a paper I prepared that outlines the severe damage unregulated
OTC derivatives have caused to the market and that proposes a generic regulatory program
designed to apply traditional and time tested tools of regulatory oversight now governing our
equity, debt and regulated futures markets to our OTC derivatives markets. Suffice it to say, that
I am in agreement with many who have already come before this committee and the Senate
Agriculture Committee on these issues, including Terrence A. Duffy, Executive Chairman of the
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CME Group, Inc9; Eric Dinallo (the New York Insurance Superintendant)10; Professor Henry Hu,
Professor of Law at the University of Texas Law School11; Professor William K. Black of the
University of Missouri-Kansas City12; and Erik Sirri, Director of SEC‟s Division of Trading and
Markets13 as to the regulation of financial OTC derivatives; and Adam White [title]14 and Gerry
Ramm [title] as to agriculture and energy OTC derivatives. Former Chair of the Federal
Reserve, Paul Volker, has elsewhere made recommendations and observations consistent with
the above referenced testimony15, as has the January 29, 2009 Special Report on Regulatory
Reform of the Congressional Oversight Panel mandated by the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (“the bailout legislation”).16 Finally, former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt
has recommended reversal of the deregulatory effects of 2000 Commodity Futures
Modernization Act on the OTC markets17, and even former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan has
admitted that it was an error to deregulate the credit default swaps market.18
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I am pleased that the draft legislation that we discuss today adopts most of the points
made in my appended paper and the recommendations of the witnesses I have cited above.
In this regard, I support Discussion Draft‟s:
1. Requirement of mandatory clearing of OTC derivatives both through the
CFTC or other appropriate federal financial regulators and by the CFTC
exclusively in the energy and agriculture markets.
2. Reporting requirements and regulatory oversight obligations placed on
designated clearing organizations (“DCOs”).
3. Tailored, precise, and limited exemptions that may be granted by the CFTC to
the mandatory clearing requirements for individually negotiated or, in the
words of Goldman Sachs‟ E. Gerald Corrigan, “bespoke” derivatives, i.e.,
derivatives that by the instrument‟s limited reach and their unsuitability for
trading cannot cause systemic risk to the nation‟s economy.
4. Imposition of speculative limits for non-commercial trading on designated
contract markets (“DCMs”), designated transaction execution facilities
(“DTEFs”) and on other electronic trading facilities, as well as Foreign Boards
of Trade, especially insofar as those speculation limits are recommended by
Position Limit Advisory Groups composed in significant part by commercial
hedgers within the relevant markets, i.e., those who have intimate knowledge
of the degree of speculation needed in each market to provide liquidity.
5. Establishment of a clear and concise definition of a “bona fide hedging
transaction” limiting that exclusion from speculation limits to those actually
engaged as a primary business activity in the “physical marketing channel” of
the commodity.
6. Imposition of three additional core principles to the criteria for establishing of
a designated clearing organization (“DCO”): (1) disclosure of general
information; (2) publication of trading information; and (3) fitness standards.
7. “Transition rule” requiring existing uncleared swaps or uncleared swaps
executed for the period after enactment to establish the regulatory scheme to
be required by the statute to be reported to the CFTC.
8. The banning of “naked” credit default swaps, i.e., those swaps that are merely
a wager on the viability of an institution or financial instrument without
requiring the corresponding underlying risk from the failure of those
institutions or instruments.
9. The creation of an independent CFTC Inspector General confirmed by the
Senate.
10. The appointment of at least 200 new full time CFTC employees.
With regard to my comments in support of the draft legislation, I want to particularly call
attention to two commendable aspects of the legislation.
1. The ban on “naked” credit default swaps. Former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
has since September 2008 repeatedly criticized these instruments as “naked” shorts
on public corporations that evade the requirements for shorting stocks in the regulated
5

equity markets.19 He and the New York Insurance Superintendent, Eric Dinallo, have
warned that these instruments encourage the “moral hazard” of providing perverse
incentives to take actions that cause companies covered by the CDS to fail or, in the
case of naked short of subprime mortgage paper, borrowers to default on their
mortgage loans.20 As to incentives of undercut the mortgage backed paper, i.e.,
mortgage backed securities or collateralized debt obligations, that has led many
holders of CDS guarantees to oppose, for example, mortgage workouts so that
mortgage defaults trigger “naked” CDS payments. Chairman Peterson had it exactly
right when he recently said: “‟It is hard for me to understand what useful purpose
these things are serving, . . . I‟m not out to get Wall Street, but what‟s gone on there is
jeopardizing the world economy.‟”21 Those who support “naked” CDS argue that it is
needed for “price discovery.” However, the reported “short interest” on public
companies in the regulated equities market already is an adequate “price discovery
mechanism” for the worth of those companies. For price discovery on CDS
guarantees of collateralized debt obligations, those CDS that insure actual risk on
CDO investments should serve any needed price discovery function; to the extent that
“real” CDS are inadequate for that purpose, the undisputed harm done to the economy
by “naked” CDS far outweighs any price discovery benefits from allowing the
continued trading of “naked” CDS. Had “naked” CDS been banned in the passage of
the CFMA in 2000, it is my firm belief that there would have been no need for this
hearing today in that the outlawing of that product, in and of itself, would have
substantially mitigated the worldwide financial meltdown we are now experiencing.
2. Mandatory Clearing. While the financial services industry has supported the
“availability” of clearing OTC derivatives as a “firewall” against systemic risk, they
have, for the most part, opposed mandatory clearing. As has been explained in
testimony by the CME Group, for example, a clearing facility, which is guaranteeing
the performance of both counterparties to an OTC derivative contract, can only
assume that substantial risk for performance for those contracts about which it has
complete understanding. The requirement to understand contractual risk, inter alia,
requires that the OTC cleared contracts be standardized, i.e., so that the clearing
facility has substantial comprehension of the guarantor role it is playing. Those who
oppose mandatory clearing worry about the inability to clear non-standardized OTC
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derivatives. As far back as 1993, however, the CFTC has promulgated a “swaps”
exemption for individual negotiated swaps agreements that are not executed on an
electronic trading facility.22 Moreover, the draft legislation provides an arguably
broader “individualized” exemption with the corresponding precise standards that
assure that the exemption will only be granted when systemic risks will not be posed.
In short, the draft legislation is a reasonable compromise that accommodates
individually negotiated contracts that cannot be cleared. It should also be born in
mind that the Senator Harkin‟s legislation flatly bans exceptions from his requirement
that all OTC contracts be exchange traded – not merely cleared.23 In this regard, the
New York Stock Exchange has just advocated that “U.S. policy makers should extend
existing [exchange] rules so that they apply to unregulated derivatives instead of
drafting new legislation that may take years to implement, . . .”24
My only questions and/or comments on the draft legislation are:
1. Express Pre-approval Findings of Suitability of Designated Clearing Organizations.
The CFMA sets out 14 core principles for the establishment of a DCO. As
mentioned above, the discussion draft adds three new core principles borrowed from
the core principles applicable to designated transaction execution facilities DTEFs
(i.e. non-retail exchange trading for high net work institutions and individuals).
However, as made clear by the CFTC‟s Director of Clearing and Intermediary
Organizations, Ananda Radhakrishnan, under the Commodity Exchange Act, “DCOs
do not need pre-approval from the CFTC to clear derivatives, [but] any such initiative
would be required to comply with the relevant core principles set forth in the [statute]
and the CFTC would review it for compliance with those principles. . . .”25 In other
words, the statute allows facilities to self certify as DCOs and the CFTC would only
then examine compliance with core principles after the fact. As is now well known,
the CFTC “announced” on December 23, 2008 that “the CFTC staff would not object
to the [DCO] certification.”26 The CME submitted its plans to the CFTC staff prior to
the operation of its DCO. The “CFTC staff reviewed CME‟s plans to clear credit
22
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default swaps, including CME‟s planning risk management procedures, . . .”27 My
search of the CME docket number on the CFTC web site shows no accompanying
order by the Commission or the CFTC staff indicating or explaining such approval. I
hasten to add that I have little doubt about the qualifications (or indeed the great
benefit) of the CME, the world‟s largest derivatives exchanges, engaging in this
clearing. However, others are eligible to apply for DCO status and in an age when the
American public is clamoring for transparency in governmental actions, especially
actions surrounding the present financial crisis, and given the great importance of
approving an institution to clear these highly volatile and potentially toxic products, it
would seem that pre-approval of a clearing facility should be required and that the
Commission –not just the staff – should issue affirmative and detailed findings about
its confidence in the applicant serving as a DCO. Indeed, prior to the passage of the
CFMA in December 2000, the CFTC and its staff issued 18 single space pages of
detailed findings endorsing the safety and soundness of the first applicant to clear
swaps.28 Since the CFTC staff checks the safety and soundness of a DCO one way or
another, the Committee should add a provision to the legislation requiring preapproval of DCOs trading OTC derivatives and that that pre-approval be
accompanied by findings demonstrating that the DCO applicant meets all applicable
statutory requirements. Given the importance of the clearing facility in serving as a
firewall against breakdown of the economy, it seems a small burden to require a
transparent Commission document reflecting its careful attention this important
decision.
2. Fraud and Manipulation. As the CFMA is presently drafted, the swaps exemption in
section 2 (g) of the Act excludes swaps from the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation
provisions within the statute.29 (This exclusion distinguishes itself from “exempt”
commodities, e.g., energy futures, which are subject to the Act‟s fraud and
manipulation prohibitions.) Senator Harkin‟s legislation, S. 272, by requiring the
exchange trading of swaps and the elimination of “exemptions” and “exclusions”
brings the swaps market within the umbrella of the Act‟s central fraud and
manipulation prohibitions. As Patrick Parkinson (Deputy Director, Division of
Research and Statistics of the Federal Reserve System) made clear in his November
20, 2008 testimony before this Committee, the President‟s Working Group on
Financial Markets is advising that OTC clearing facilities qualifications be measured
against the “Recommendations for Central Counterparties” of the Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systems of which Mr. Parkinson was the Co- Chair and on
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which the CFTC and SEC served.30 Those recommendations are replete with
concerns about combating fraud in the clearing process. In the present climate of
American public‟s distrust of financial markets, OTC swaps, as is true of “exempt”
futures, should be subject to fraud and manipulation prohibitions. Moreover, it would
seem to be a difficult argument to make that, whereas swaps should be cleared, fraud
and manipulation should not be barred or, conversely, that logic would seem
perversely to dictate that fraud and manipulation be permitted.31
3. Important Inconsistency between Sections 6 and 9 of the Discussion Draft. As I read
Section 6 (2) (A) of the Discussion Draft, it requires that the CFTC “shall . . .
establish limits on the amount of positions, as appropriate, other than bona fide
hedge[rs] that may be held by any person with respect to . . . commodities traded . . .
on an electronic trading facility as a significant price discovery contract.” Section 6
(B) (i) and (iii) mandate that these limits “shall be established” within set time periods
for “exempt commodities” and “excluded commodities.” Exempt commodities
include over-the-counter energy futures contracts exempt from regulation by § 2 (h)
of the CEA. Excluded commodities cover swaps are exempt under § 2 (g). Therefore,
it would seem that Section 6 of the Discussion Draft mandates the imposition of
position limits on OTC “exempt” and “excluded” trading. Moreover, Section 6 seems,
by the breadth of its language, to authorize implicitly the CFTC to impose aggregated
limits across contract markets for specified commodities. On the other hand, Section
9, by its terms, appears to require the CFTC to “study” each of these issues already
addressed in Section 6 and to report back to this Committee within one year of
enactment. Given the overwhelming evidence that has been gathered about the impact
of excessive speculation on the energy futures and energy swaps markets32, for
example, Section 9 should be struck from that statute, because the time for study has
long since passed. Moreover, I would urge this Committee to follow the bi-partisan
lead of Senators Reid, Lieberman and Collins33 and require – not simply authorize –
the CFTC to impose aggregated speculation limits upon U.S. traders and those trading
in the U.S. across the energy and agriculture contract markets. It should be
emphasized that on July 26, 2008 [check date] the Reid bill garnered 50 of 93 Senate
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Patrick M. Parkinson, Statement of Testimony before the Committee on Agriculture United States House of
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votes in the last Congress in an unsuccessful attempt to sustain cloture in the last
Congress.34 Again, given the heightened evidence of excessive speculation in the
crude oil markets that post-date that July 26th vote, it could be expected that the 60
votes needed to bring the Reid aggregate spec limits bill to a vote on the merits will
be reached in this Congress. My understanding is that this Committee will receive
testimony from a broad coalition of industrial consumers of energy, including the
airlines, truckers, farmers, heating oil dealers, and petroleum marketers, strongly
backing the inclusion of aggregated spec limits for energy and agriculture in any bill
reported out by this Committee.
4. Standards for Approving a Designated Clearing Organization. As stated above, I
support the Discussion Draft‟s addition of three core principles to the statute‟s 14
criteria governing the approval of DCOs. I have also recommended above that the
Commission – and not just the CFTC staff – make detailed pre-approval findings that
the applicant for DCO status meets the criteria for clearing OTC derivatives. Again,
the approval process is critical because it is universally recognized that a “risk
management failure by a [clearing facility] has the potential to disrupt the markets it
serves and . . . [cause] disruptions to securities and derivatives markets and to
payment and settlement systems, . . .” A mistaken decision by the CFTC about the
appropriateness of an applicant to serve as a DCO will simply recreate the instability
of the present system where counterparties – even counterparties rated AAA at the
commencement of the derivatives transactions – were ultimately downgraded and not
able to fulfill their contractual obligations. The DCO approval decision requires great
sophistication. Three years ago, many then AAA rated institutions, such as Lehman,
Bear Stearns, or AIG, would have very likely been deemed strong DCO candidates.
In short, today‟s AAA rated institution may be tomorrow‟s undercapitalized and
overwhelmed entity whose failure will undermine the OTC derivatives settlement
process; and possibly the Nation‟s economy as a whole. The Fed‟s and the SEC‟s
reliance, for example, on the intricately detailed CPSS‟s “Recommendation for
Central Counterparties,” raises the question whether the CFMA‟s generalized DCO
approval criteria – even as supplemented by the Discussion Draft‟s three additional
criteria – are detailed enough to ensure that only the most prudent and stable entities
to clear OTC derivatives. If the CPSS‟s recommendations are more thorough in this
regard (they are certainly more detailed), adoption of the CPSS‟s standards by other
committees of Congress for their regulators, may become a pretext to seek the
removal of the CFTC from clearing approval authority. The CPSS recommendations
should be studied to ensure that that the DCO criteria are complete.
It is for that reason that my preference would be to adopt exchange trading criteria
to OTC derivatives as is required by S. 272. The New York Stock Exchange has also
recently supported an exchange based approach.35The statutory requirements for a

34
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designated transaction execution facility are more rigorous than those for a DCO even
as those DCO criteria are upgraded by the discussion draft. DCOs are not expressly
required to establish net capital requirements or financial integrity standards for
counterparties;36 there is no regulation of DCO intermediaries as is true in the case of
DTEFs;3738 unlike DTEFs, the emergency authority of a DCO is expressly limited to
withstanding "disasters" which in context of the statute is appears to be limited to
natural disasters or Y2K types of information technology problems and not the threat
of a systemic meltdown of the facility as a whole ;39 and there is no requirement for
self regulation of DCOs as is true of DTEFs.40 Finally, while it is true that DTEFs,
unlike Designated Contract Markets (“DCM”), do not expressly have to establish
dispute resolution mechanisms, this would be a worthy requirement to be applied to
DCOs dealing with the highly volatile OTC derivatives markets.41
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a registered DTEF) and 7 U.S.C. § 7a (c)(4) (2008) (mandating that DTEF boards of trade must “establish and
enforce rules or terms and conditions providing for the financial integrity” of both participants and transactions
entered on or through the board of trade) to 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (c)(2)(C)(i) (2008) (merely requiring “appropriate
minimum financial requirements” for admission and continued eligibility, but providing no explicit standards).
37

Intermediaries, such as futures commission merchants, depository institutions, and Farm Credit System
Institutions, must meet certain requirements in order to interact with a DTEF. 7 U.S.C. § 7a (e)(1) (2008). The
intermediary must be in good standing with the SEC or the Federal bank regulatory agencies (whichever is
appropriate. 7 U.S.C. § 7a (e)(2)(A) (2008). Additionally, if the intermediary holds customer funds for more than a
day, it must be registered as futures commission merchant and must be a member of a registered futures association.
7 U.S.C. § 7a (e)(2)(B) (2008). There is no statutory equivalent for DCOs concerning FCMs, depository institutions
Farm Credit Institutions, or any other type of intermediary. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (2008).
38

See 7 U.S.C. § 7a (d)(7) (2008) (stating that “the board of trade shall establish and enforce appropriate fitness
standards for directors, members of any disciplinary committee, members, and any other persons with direct access
to the facility, including any parties affiliated with any of the persons described in this [statute].”). There is no
comparable requirement for DCOs. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (2008).
39

7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (c)(2)(I)(ii) (2008) (requiring the maintenance of emergency procedures , a disaster recovery plan,
and periodic testing of backup facilities, but not the establishment of a contingency plan to deal with economic
emergencies).
40

While both DTEFs and DCOs have various requirements that they are responsible for carrying out, it is only in the
context DTEFs that the concept of “self regulation” is expressly addressed. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a (b)(2)(E) (2008)
(noting that the Commission will consider the entities history of this self regulation when determining if there is a
threat of manipulation); see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 7a (d)(2008) (explaining the core principles and explicit duties of a
DTEF); 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (c)(2) (2008) (listing in broad terms the responsibilities of a DCO).
41

However, it is worth noting that:
a board of trade may elect to operate as a registered derivatives transaction execution facility if the facility
is-(1) designated as a contract market and meets the requirements of this section; or
(2) registered as a derivatives transaction execution facility under subsection (c) of this section.
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In sum, the Committee should be congratulated for the scope of its hearings on these
critically important questions and for the thoroughness of the Discussion Draft.

7 U.S.C. § 7a (a)(1)-(2) (2008).
If the DTEF chose to operation under section (1), it follows that the board of trade would be obligated to follow all
of the requirements for a DCM.
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Appendix A
Memorandum
on
Regulatory Reform of Credit Default Swaps
Professor Michael Greenberger
January 24, 2009
While a litany of factors including lending and financial abuses led to the present
economic meltdown, chief among them was the opaque nature of the estimated notional $596
trillion1 unregulated over-the-counter derivatives market. That market includes what is estimated
to be the $35-65 trillion credit default swaps (“CDS”) market.2 The over-the-counter derivatives
market was, prior to December 20, 2000, conventionally understood to be subject to regulation
under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”). On that date, the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act (“CFMA”) was passed. That legislation was, for the most part, rushed
through Congress and enacted during a lame duck session as a rider to an 11,000 page omnibus
appropriation bill.3 That statute removed swaps transactions from all meaningful federal
oversight.
In warning Congress about badly needed reform efforts when it considered the bailout
legislation in Senate hearings before the Senate Banking Committee in September, 2008, SEC
Chairman Christopher Cox called the CDS market a “regulatory blackhole” in need of
“immediate legislative action.”4 Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt and even former Fed Chair
Alan Greenspan have acknowledged that the deregulation of the CDS market contributed greatly
to the present economic downfall.5
In brief, the securitization of subprime mortgage loans evolved from simple mortgage
backed securities (“MBS”) to highly complex collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”), which
were the pulling together and dissection into “tranches” of huge numbers of MBS, theoretically
designed to diversify and offer gradations of risk to those who wished to invest in that market.

1

See, Bank for International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review (September, 2008), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa0809.pdf#page=108
2

Id.

3

See, e.g., Johnson & Hazen, Derivatives Regulation, § 1.17 at 41-49 (2009 Cum. Supp.)

4

“‟The regulatory blackhole for credit-default swaps is one of the most significant issues we are confronting on the
current credit crisis,‟ Cox said, „it is requires immediate legislative action.‟” O‟Harrow and Denis, Downgrades and
Downfall, Washington Post (December 31, 2008) A1.
5

Goodman, The Reckoning: Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy (October 9, 2008) A1;
http://mobile.newsweek.com/detail.jsp?key=39919&rc=camp2008&p=0&all=1

However, investors became unmoored from the essential risk underlying loans to non-credit
worthy individuals by the continuous reframing of the form of risk (e.g., from mortgages to MBS
to CDOs); the false assurances given by credit rating agencies that gave misleadingly high
evaluations of the CDOs; and, most importantly, by the “insurance” offered by CDO issuers in
the form of CDS. The CDS “swap” was the exchange by one counter party of a premium for the
other counterparty‟s “guarantee” of the financial stability of the CDO. While CDS has all the
hallmarks of insurance, issuers of CDS were urged not to refer to it as “insurance” out of a fear
that CDS would be subject to insurance regulation by state insurance commissioners. By using
the term “swaps,” CDS fell into the regulatory blackhole afforded by the CFMA.
Because CDS was not insurance or any other regulated instrument, the issuers of CDS
were not required to set aside adequate capital reserves to stand behind the guarantee of the
financial stability of CDOs. The issuers of CDS were beguiled by the utopian view (supported by
ill considered mathematical algorithms) that housing prices would always go up and that, even a
borrower who could not afford a mortgage at initial closing, would soon be able to extract that
appreciating value in the residence to refinance and pay mortgage obligations. Under this utopian
view, the writing of CDS was deemed to be “risk free” with a goal of writing as many CDS as
possible to develop cash flow from the “premiums.”
To make matters worse, CDS was deemed to be so risk free (and so much in demand)
that financial institutions began to write “naked” CDS, i.e., offering the guarantee to investors
who had no risk in any underlying mortgage backed instruments or CDOs. Naked CDS provided
a method to “short” the mortgage lending market, i.e., to place the perfectly logical bet for little
consideration (i.e. the premium) that those who could not afford mortgages would not pay them
off. The literature surrounding this subject estimates that more “naked” CDS instruments are
extant than CDS guaranteeing actual risk.
Finally, the problem was further aggravated by the development of “synthetic” CDOs.
Again, these synthetics were mirror images of “real” CDOs, thereby allowing an investor to play
“fantasy” securitization. That is, the purchaser of a synthetic CDO does not “own” any of the
underlying mortgage or securitized instruments, but is simply placing a “bet” on the financial
value of a the CDO that is being mimicked.
Because both “naked” CDS and “synthetic” CDOs were nothing more than “bets” on the
viability of the subprime market, it was important for this financial market to rely upon the fact
that the CFMA expressly preempted state gaming laws.6
It is now common knowledge that: (1) issuers of CDS did not (and will not) have
adequate capital to pay off guarantees as housing prices plummet, thereby defying the supposed
“risk free” nature of issuing huge guarantees for the small premiums that were paid; (2) because

6

Johnson & Hazen, Derivatives Regulation, §4.04[11] at 975 (2004 ed) referencing 7 U.S.C. § 16 (e) (2).
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CDS are private bilateral arrangements for which there is no meaningful “reporting” to federal
regulators, the triggering of the obligations there under often come as a “surprise” to both the
financial community and government regulators; (3) as the housing market worsens, new CDS
obligations are triggered, creating heightened uncertainty about the viability of financial
institutions who have or may have issued these instruments, thereby leading to the tightening of
credit;; (4) the issuance of “naked” CDS increases exponentially the obligations of the CDS
underwriters; and (5) the securitization structure (i.e. asset backed securities, CDOs and CDS) is
present not only in the subprime mortgage market, but in the prime mortgage market, as well as
in commercial real estate, credit card debt, and auto and student loans. As these latter parts of
the economy falter, the toxicity of the underlying financial structure falls into a continuous
destabilizing pattern. As a result, for example, the Fed is now spending $200 billion to buy
instruments outside of the residential mortgage market.7
Finally, while CDS and synthetic CDOs constitute the lit fuse that leads to the exploding
financial destabilization we are experiencing today, the remainder of the over-the-counter
derivatives market has historically led to other destabilizing events in the economy, including the
recent energy and food commodity bubble (energy and agriculture swaps), the failure of Long
Term Capital Management in 1998 (currency and equity swaps), and the Bankers Trust scandal
and the Orange Country bankruptcy of 1994 (interest rate swaps).
Because “swaps” are risk shifting instruments or, in their most useful sense, hedges
against financial risk, they were almost certainly subject to the Commodity Exchange Act prior
to the passage of the CFMA in 2000. The Commodity Future Trading Commission (“CFTC”) in
1993 exempted swaps from that CEA‟s exchange trading requirement if their material economic
terms were individually negotiated and if they were not traded on a computerized exchange.8
However, the 1993 exemption did not satisfy the financial services sector and, by 1998, the
market grew to over $28 trillion in notional value without utter disregard for the exchange
trading requirements within the CEA.
As a result in May 1998, the CFTC, under the leadership of then Chair Brooksley Born,
issued a “concept release” inviting public comment on how that multi-trillion dollar industry
might most effectively be covered by the CEA on a “prospective” basis.9 While that effort was
blocked by the Executive Branch and Congress (including the passage of the CFMA in 2000),
the CFTC concept release spelled out a menu of regulatory tools that have historically been

7

GAO Report, supra note 17, at 31; Press Release, Federal Reserve, Nov. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm
8

17 C.R.F. Part 35 (1993).

9

63 Fed. Reg. 26114 (May 12, 1998)
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applied to financial instruments, e.g., equities, bonds, and traditional futures contracts that have
the financial force to destabilize the economy systemically.
The classic indicia of regulation of financial instruments that have potential systemic
adverse impacts on the economy include:
1. Transparency. These kinds of financial instruments are reported to, and, even often,
registered with, a federal oversight agency prior to execution. Transparency also
requires that all transactions and holding be accounted for on audited financial
statements. The present meltdown has been characterized by the use of off balance
sheet investment vehicles, e.g., structured investment vehicles (“SIVs”) to house
those instruments with potential systemic risk hidden from public view.
2. Record Keeping. Counterparties should be required to keep records of these
transactions for 5 years.
3. Immediate Complete Documentation. Since August 2005, the Fed has complained
that financial instruments pertaining to credit derivatives have been poorly
documented with back offices being very far behind the execution of credit
derivatives by sales personnel.
4. Capital Adequacy. Federal regulators traditionally require that parties to regulated
transactions have adequate capital reserves to ensure payment obligations.
5. Disclosure. Federal regulators traditionally require full and meaningful disclosure
about the risks of entering into the regulated transaction.
6. Anti-fraud authority and anti-manipulation. The regulated markets are governed by
statutes that bar fraud and manipulation. The CFMA provided only limited fraud
protection for counterparties by the SEC. The inadequacy of that protection is
evidenced by both SEC Chairman Cox and former SEC Chairman Levitt calling
regulation of these markets a “regulatory blackhole.”10 Fraud protection without
transparency to the federal regulator is meaningless. Moreover, no manipulation
protection was included within the CFMA with regard to swaps. Effectively, the
CFMA authorized this massive multi-trillion dollar worldwide swaps market without
any provisions for protecting against fraud or manipulation. Fraud and antimanipulation protections included within the securities and regulated futures laws
should be restored to these markets.
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See Speech by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox: Opening Remarks at SEC Roundtable on Modernizing the
Securities and Exchange Commission‟s Disclosure System (Oct. 8, 2008).
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7. Registration of Intermediaries. “Brokers” of equity and regulated futures
transactions are subject to registration requirements and prudential conduct. There is
no such protection within the swaps market.
8. Private Enforcement. As is true in securities laws and laws applying to the regulated
futures markets, private parties in the swaps markets should have access to federal
courts to enforce anti-fraud and anti-manipulation requirements, thereby not leaving
enforcement entirely in the hands of overworked (and sometimes unsympathetic)
federal enforcement agencies.
9. Mandatory Self Regulation. As is true of the securities and traditional futures
industries, swaps dealers should be required to establish a self regulatory framework,
including market surveillance.
10. Clearing. Again, as is true of the regulated securities and regulated futures
infrastructure, a strong clearing intermediary should clear all trades as further
protection against a lack of creditworthiness of counterparties.
The adoption of the traditional regulatory protections for swaps with systemic risk
characteristics would essentially return these markets to where they were as a matter of
law prior to the passage of the CFMA in 2000. The general template would be that swaps
would have to be traded on a regulated exchange (which provides each of the protections
outlined above) unless the proponents of a risk shifting instrument bear the burden of
demonstrating to a federal regulator that the instrument cannot cause systemic risk and
will not lead to fraudulent or manipulative practices if traded outside an exchange
environment. It is for that reason, for example, that, in 1993, the CFTC exempted from
exchange trading requirements privately negotiated contracts not traded in standardized
format.
The Senate Chair of the committee of jurisdiction over swaps, Senator Harkin11 ,
has argued that trading in these instruments should be moved back onto regulated
exchanges and he even posed the possibility of an outright ban on “naked” CDS. In
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Lynch, Harkin Seeks to Force All Derivatives on Exchanges, Wall Street Journal November 20, 2008 at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122721812727545583.html. See also Hunton & Williams LLP, The Derivatives
Trading Integrity Act - Beginning of the End for OTC Trading?, December 2008, available at
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s10News%5CFileUpload44%5C15843%5Cderivatives_trading_integrity_act.pdf (
"Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) introduced the Derivatives Trading Integrity Act of
2008 ("the Bill"), hoping to end "casino capitalism" in the market for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. The Bill
amends the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) to require that all contracts with future delivery trade on regulated
exchanges similar to how commodity futures currently trade...The Bill reverses [the CFMA], forcing swap
transactions to be conducted on designated or registered clearing houses or derivatives clearing organizations.").
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other words, he has called for reversing the CFMA in this regard and returning to the
regulated exchange trading environment with direct federal oversight and self regulatory
protections that existed prior to the passage of the CFMA.
Three final points should be made.
Simple Clearing Is Not Enough. The financial services industry and the Bush
Administration have argued that clearing facilities for CDS will provide adequate
regulation. Clearing proposals have been advanced to the FED, the SEC, and the CFTC,
where they are in various stages of approval. As I understand it, the clearing is wholly
voluntary. Second, clearing without each of the other regulatory attributes outlined
above, while helpful, does not provide a systemic risk firewall. Stocks and traditional
futures trading have a complete regulatory infrastructure built around the clearing
process. For example, we would never settle for clearing, and clearing alone, as a
substitute for the regulatory and self regulatory structure that surrounds the equities
market.
Moreover, clearing without other prudential safeguards just places an apparently
sound financial institution as the guarantor of the counterparties. Five years ago, AIG
might have convincingly advanced itself as such an institution. Similarly, a AAA entity
that appears sound today may become unstable if the entire derivatives market is not
adequately policed. In sum, the limited step of clearing by itself does not adequately
protect against systemic risk.
State Insurance Regulation. As mentioned above, CDS has all of the attributes of
insurance. As a result, the New York Insurance Superintendant and the Governor of New
York in September 2008 required that its insurance registrants trading CDS to those
wanting to indemnify their own real risks in the mortgage market be subject to state
insurance law by January 1, 2009 with corresponding capital adequacy requirements.12
In this vein, it is interesting to note that AIG, a New York insurance regulatee, had $20
billion in reserve for each of its regulated insurance subsidiaries at the time it was rescued
by the U.S. on September 17, 2008, because of CDS trading in an unregulated portion of
the company. That fact seems to be unanswerable vindication of the efficacy of state
insurance regulation, which is even now not preempted by the CFMA. In November
2008, New York temporarily suspended the CDS mandate it had issued in September on
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New York State Insurance Dept., Recognizing Progress By Federal Government In Developing Oversight
Framework For Credit Default Swaps, New York Will Stay Plan To Regulate Some Credit Default Swaps, press
release, November 20, 2008 ("Dinallo announced that New York had determined that some credit default swaps
were subject to regulation under state insurance law and that the New York State Insurance Department would begin
to regulate them on January 1, 2009.").
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the theory that the prospects for federal regulation had improved.13 On January 24, 2009,
the National Conference of Insurance Legislators is holding a hearing in New York City
to discuss whether CDS should be subject to state regulation. My view is that state efforts
in this should be encouraged as a further safeguard against systemic risk, especially
insofar as the CFMA itself did not preempt state insurance laws. The CFMA limited its
preemptive effect to state gaming and bucket shop laws.
As some commentators have also made clear, the New York Insurance
Superintendant‟s proposed extension to of New York insurance law relating to those
seeking to indemnify actual risks from the actual holding of CDOs is too limited.
“Naked” CDS, or the guarantees to counterparties who hold no CDO risk and who just
want to bet against mortgage commitments being fulfilled, are the kind of insurance that
led to the creation of state insurance laws.14 Under state insurance laws, you cannot
insure against someone else‟s risk. Insurance of that kind creates so-called “moral
hazard,” or the creation of perverse and nonproductive incentives to take actions that will
lead to the triggering of the insurance guarantee. For example, the holder of a “naked”
CDS might want to interfere with mortgage “work outs” to avoid defaults on loans,
thereby insuring that the “guarantee” against loan default within the naked CDS will be
triggered. Accordingly, if states are to regulate here, they should bar “naked” CDS as the
very kind of unlawful insurance that caused regulation in this area.
Finally, there is a strong “regulatory reform” movement to preempt some or all of
state insurance law in favor of a federal insurance regulator.15 If the states “stand down”
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New York State Insurance Dept., Recognizing Progress By Federal Government In Developing Oversight
Framework For Credit Default Swaps, New York Will Stay Plan To Regulate Some Credit Default Swaps, press
release, November 20, 2008 (Superintendent Dinallo stating "I am pleased to see that our strong stand has
encouraged the industry and the federal government to begin developing comprehensive solutions. Accordingly, we
will delay indefinitely regulating part of the market.").
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Kimbal-Stanley, Arthur , Dissecting A Strange Financial Creature, The Providence Journal, April 7, 2008
("Insurance contracts used to protect against the loss of property owned by the person buying the policy helped the
buyer eliminate the consequences of calamity. Insurance contracts used to bet on whether or not calamity would
befall someone else's property not only let the buyer place a bet, it gave the buyer incentive to make that calamity
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contract. In 1746, Parliament passed the Marine Insurance Act, requiring anyone seeking to collect on an insurance
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doctrine….The doctrines have been part of insurance law in both England and the United States (which in 1746
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on the CDS market, i.e., consciously decide not to regulate products that have all the
elements of insurance, in favor of exclusive federal regulation, that will be the first
exhibit used by those advocating federal regulation as to the purported inadequacy of
state regulation. CDS represent class insurance products.16
Structural Regulation Alone. A further school of thought, most clearly evidenced
by the President‟s Working Group on Financial Markets “regulatory reform” proposal of
March 2008, is that the present regulatory failures have been caused by structural
inadequacies, e.g., too many regulators looking at huge institutions carrying out in a
single structure a host of financial activities.17 The March 2008 proposal was intended to
mimic the U.K.‟s then extant unified regulatory structure that was premised on
“principles” rather than “rules.” For example, the March 2008 proposal would merge the
CFTC into the SEC, but have the SEC use the CFTC‟s “principles” based regulation.
Moreover, the March 2008 proposal would hand over to the Fed considerable
consolidated “rescue” powers. It may very well be that there needs to be a restructuring
of the federal regulatory system. However, the adverse lesson emanating from the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security should be an object lesson in the
dangers of governmental reorganization in a time of crisis. More importantly, it is not
enough to improve federal “rescue” capabilities. There are neither principles nor rules
that govern the OTC derivatives market. It is a “blackhole.” Even the U.K. is “reforming”
its regulatory structure, recognizing that it was inadequate to the task in the present
meltdown.
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http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf

8

